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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

E.A.RL W. WILSON, doing business as

Wilson's Used Cars and HARTFORD
ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY CO., a
corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE INDl~"STRIAL COM~IISSION OF
UTAH, ROBERTA BARNEY, widow,
and BE\TERLY BARNEY, minor
daughter of Frank Barney, deceased,
Defendants.

Case No.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OiF FAC·T
The Respondents deem it advisable to amplify the
Statement of Facts set out by the Appellants in their
brief. The Appellants have called to your attention the
basic. facts around which this case revolves itself, and
repetition thereof is unnecessary herein. But said Appellant's Statement of Facts is incomplete relative to certain in1portant details pertaining to the nature of the
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decedent's work and his employment status on the morning of January 9, 1947, at which time he suffered his
fatal injuries. The Appellant's Statement of Facts is
therefore, adopted except as is denied, explained or'
added to in the following. The employment of Frank
l~arney, the deceased, with Earl W. Wilson, the employer
herein, was intermittent (Tr. 7). Barney had not been
a regular etnployee on a monthly salary and his hours of
work varied ( Tr. 13-27). Barney was used in different
eapacities, as foreman, mechanic and as a salesman CTr.
8). He workeu at different places because Wilson had
shops in Salt Lake, Ogden and Magna, Utah and Phoenix,
. A.rizona ( T r. 8). Barney was allowed to arrange his work
as he saw fit (Tr. 25 ), and Wilson usually gave no specific orders to Barney (Tr. 2, 3), but Barney was supposed
to be on the job at 8 A.M. and was to work until 5 P.M.
(Tr. 10, 11, 23, 25, 28, 35, 36), leaving Barney to regulate
within those hours, his own time and do the work n1ost
needed to be done. For about three days prior to the
fatal accident, Barney had been working in Magna, getting the Magna shop in operation. But Wilson, in his
testimony, again emphasized that Barney was more or
less on his own and as far as Wilson lmew, the work
Barney had been doing at Magna was just setting the
shop in order to get it going (Tr. 15). Barney's work
was connected with all the other places that Wilson had
in operation (Tr. 9, 10, 23, 26, 27, 39).
On the morning of the fatal accident, Barney and
a Mr. Reed .Allen Foote, left Salt Salt City in Foote's
automobile at about 8:00 (Tr. 30) for Magna, Utah.
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The fatal accident orcurred at about ~ :lj ~\.11. Ba1·Ht~y
,ya 8 supposed to be 'vorking in 8alt Lake City on that
daY but "-as being sent to .Jlagna to pick up an autom~bile. He \\-as then to return to Salt I.. ake a~ soon as
possible "ith the automobile and to pick up his work
according to his assignment in Salt Lake. Barney wasn't
even required or expected to report for work at Magna
(Tr. 27, 28, 29) but merely, as stated above, to get the
car and then report for work in Salt Lake ..A. s has been
pointed out, \Vilson usually gave no orders to Barney
as to the work he should do ( Tr. 23) but on this particular
occasion, \\~ilson had given Barney specific orders to go
to Magna for this automobile, as indicated above. Barney
had received these orders the night before at \\:ilson 's
home, and 'Yas fulfilling the specific orders at the tim·e
of his fa tal injury ( Tr. 18, 23, 24). It had been planned
and 'vas the usual custom that Barney was to take or
'vould have taken his employer's wrecker to Magna to
pick up this automobile, but the 'vrecker was out of
repair on this particular day; therefore, Barney was
left to seek his own transportation to :lliagna. He rode
to niagna with :Jir. Foote, 'vho is a mechanic, regularly
assigned to that shop (Tr. 9, 10).
ARGUMEN·T
The sole question before this court is whether or not
Frank Barney, the deceased, sustained an injury arising
out of or in the course of his employment with Earl W.
\\Tilson on the 9th day of January, 1947. The Appellants
haYr very· thoroughly discussed the general rule relatin• to this matter, namely, that an injury sustained by
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an einployee, while going to or returning from work,
generally does not arise out of or in the course of his
e1n ploy1nent and that no compensation can be paid therefor. Iiespondents concede that this is the general rule
and that it is very thoroughly supported by the authoritieH. rl,he Appellants further, in their brief, point out the
exceptions to this rule and attempt to show that the case
before the court does not come under any of these socalled exceptions. The Respondents respectfully submit
that the case now before the court does come, and is very
definitely to be identified with the exception to the general rule, kno\vn as the special mission or special errand
doctrine.
May we briefly review the facts. Barney, as well as
all other employees of Wilson, were ''supposed to he on
the job'' from 8 :00 in the morning to 5 :00 in the evening.
Barney's fatal accident occurred on company time. Barney ordinarily had no special assignments but was left
to his own good judgment as to where he was needed
the most, and on the day in question he· was supposed to
be working in the Salt Lake City shop but, as the evidence shows, he did not report at the Salt Lake shop for
the si1nple reason that he was sent on a special errand as
a preliminary to the work he was supposed to do in Salt
Lake City. It is especially noteworthy that at this particular time, Barney was not just doing regular or routine
'vork but was under specific orders, and that had he not
been sent on, and had he not been required to do, this
particular errand, he would have been in the Salt Lake
City Shop. ·Barney was fulfiiiing this mission according
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to his orders. He connuenced this errand ut tho beginning·
of his "\Yorking day and "·ns injured after this Prrand had
been started.
Barney received his orders the night befort), hut thi:-;
certainly does not 1uake, nor. could it n1ake. the ~ligh tt'st
difference in Barney's e1uployn1ent status. 'rht' que~tion
of ,vhether or not an employee is on a special errand ha~
no material connection with \vhen the orders n1ight have
been given, especially if the orders are being properly
fulfilled as to time and manner. It is also notewortl1y to
point out that if the wrecker had been in repair, Barney
would ha.ve been using company equipment on company
time. It was a mere coincidence that the wrecker was not
being used by Barney that morning. It is also important
to note that Wilson had not provided any special means
of transportation and that by not doing so, he certainly
sanctioned and approved 'vhatever means of transportation Barney might select or find available. Certainly the
intention of the employer, as to the employ1nent status
Barney should occupy that morning and the fact that he
should be and was sent on a special errand, is not changed
by the fact that the wrecker was out of repair. Barney's
"?ork that had been regular or routine (if such a label can
be attached to the work he was doing) had been for the
last three days prior to the accident, to get the Magna
shop in operation. This work was now at an end. On the
day of the injury, Barney was not doing this work at
~{agna. but had been given a new assignment and waH
on a special trip to perform a special function which
had been ordered by his employer. Barney wasn't even
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supposed to report to work at Magna that morning, which
statement was made by the employer, and certainly emphasizes the fact of a special errand assigned to Barney.
Had this accident occurred off company hours and had
Barney been merely on his way to do regular work, he no
doubt would have been in a much different situation. But
we do not have, in this case, those circumstances to contend with. Barney was on company time, under special
orders; his movements were under the control and jurisdiction of Wilson and Barney's primary, if not exclusive
purpose in being on the road to Magna, was to fulfill this
particular mission or errand.
The leading case in Utah in which our Supreme Court
has made a ruling on the special mission or special errand
doctrine is the case of Kahn Brothers Co. vs.· Industrial
Commission, 75 Utah 145, 283 Pac. 1054. On page 147 of
the Utah Reports, our Supreme Court states as follows:
It is a general rule that injuries sustained
while an employee is traveling to and from his
place of employment are not compensable. An exception to this rule, however, is where an employee, either on his employer's or his own time,
is upon some substantial mission for the employer
growing out of his employment. In such cases the
employee is within the provision of the act. The
mission for the employer must be the major factor
in the journey or movement and not merely incidental thereto. The precise question for decision therefore is, was applicant in the course of
execution of an errand or special mission on behalf of the employer at the time he suffered the
accident. If he was the award must be sustained.''
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In the Kahn case the applicant was a bookkeeper and
frequently did upto"\vn business for his employer. He also
frequently went ho1ne for lunch and did assigned work
for his en1ployer, son1etin1e on his \\Tay hom·e and sometime while returning from lunch. The injury in question in that case occurred while he was returning from
lunch and "\Yas on his way to the post office on an errand
for his employer.
This special mission theory is also discussed in another Utah case, namely, The Vitagraph Inc. vs. The Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 190, 85 Pac. (2d) 601. Our
court's statement relative to this theory is quoted by the
Appellants on page 14 of their brief, which "\Ve hereby incorporate and to which we refer the court.
Our Utah Court further passed upon this theory in
the case of Chandler vs. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah
387, 208 Pac. 499. In that case the decedent was a delivery boy. His hours of labor were from 7 :00 in the
morning until 6 :00 in the evening. On the morning of his
injury he had left home to go directly to the garage of
his employer to get the delivery truck. This was part of
his assigned duties. On his way to the garage, slightly
after 7 :00 A.M., he was injured so that death resulted.
In that case our Supreme Court stated as follows:
'' . . . If instead of going directly to the
garage, Chandler had gone to his employer's place
of business, and, upon his arrival there, had been
ordered to go to the garage for the purpose of obtaining his delivery car and for the purpose of
supervising the p~reparation of the other cars for
their drivers, the case would clearly come within
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one of the well-recognized exceptions to the general rule that an employee injured while on his
way to work and before he has received his place
of work does not come under the protection of the
Compensation Act. He took the direct route to
the garage during working hours, and, at the very
time he vvas bitten by the dog, he was engaged in
the furtherance of his employer's business and
not on an errand of his own. He was obeying the
order of his employer, the order to proceed to
the garage for the purpose of attending to his
duties there. He was under the control and direction of his employer from the moment he left home
to go to the garage for the automobile, and was
at that time in the course of, and within the scope
of, his employment. His death resulting from the
accident is therefore compensable."
Another leading case frequently re{erred to, is the
case of· I_.jondon Guaranty & Accident Co. vs. Industrial
Accident Comn1ission, (Calif.) 213 Pac. 977. In that case
the California Snprerne Court referred to the exception
now being discussed, in the following terms :
'' ... Exceptions to the general rule are cases
\Vhcre an e1nployee, either in his employer's or hi~
O\Vn time, is going to or from his place of enlplo~·
ment on some substantial1nission for his employer
gro\ving out of his employment. In such cases it
is held that the employee is within the protection
of the act. But the mission must be the major
factor in the journey or movernent, and not merely
incidental thereto~ that is to say, if incidental to
the rnain purpose of going to or from the place
of ernplo)J.nent, jt \vonld not bring such person
under the protection of the act. If, on the other
hand, the 1nain purpose of going or coming was to
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perform son1e act arising out of his employment,
he would be under the protection of the act, although incident to the perforrnance of such duty,
he might be going or corning from his home.''
The above rule from the California case has frequently been used to assist in deterrnining whether or not
a person is in the course of his employment at the thne
of injury. ~-\s this rule frorn the California court 1nay be
applied to the case before the court, we desire to point
out that Barney, the deceased, was on a ''substantial
mission'' for his employer. 'The particular assignment
or mission of Barney was the "major factor" of his going to ~[agna. Barney \vas going to l\1agna for no other
purpose than to perform that one errand. This assigned
errand was not incidental to his employment at that time,
but was the exclusive reason for the trip.
We desire further to call this court's attention to the
case of ~,r assey vs. Board of Education (N.C.) 167 S.E.
695. In that case the employee was a janitor. He was injured on his way to work and was crossing the street to
buy the cleaning materials which he had been instructed
to purchase before he came to work. The North Carolina
Supreme Court in that case stated as follows:
''. . . While service on regular hours at a
stated place generally begins at that place, there
is always room for agreement by which the service may be taken to begin earlier or elsewhere.
Service in extra hours or on special errands has
an element of distinction which the· employer may
recognize by agreeing that such service shall commence when the employee leaves his home on the
duty assigned to him and shall continue until his
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return. Any agree1nent to that effect may be either
express or be shown by the course of business. In
such case the hazards of the journey may properly
be regarded as hazards of the service and hence
within the purview of the Compensation Act."
Another decision which is followed by the North
Carolina case, just referred to, is the case of Kyle vs.
Green High School (Iowa) 226 N.W. 71. This case has
an interesting accumulation of authorities in the type of
case now before the court.
The Respondents further refer to the case of In Re
Raynes (Indiana) 118 N.E. 387. In that case the employee
was a secretary and treasurer of a corporation and in
his routine and regular work went to various cities and
towns to collect money. In this particular case, he had
been sent to Terre Haute to make collections. Only a
small part of his day was devoted to this activity. In fact,
he stayed until late at night and indulged in various personal activities. He missed his regular train and hired a
taxicab to take hin1 home. He was injured while on his
way ho1ne, after alighting from the taxicab when it
stopped for gas. In that case on page 389, the Supreme
Court of Indiana stated as follows:
"Raynes went to Terre Haute for the purpost of collecting accounts due the company. This
staten1ent is an ultimate fact. If to collect suc.h
accounts "\Vere his exclusive purpose, then in going to Terre Haute he was discharging the duties
of his employment. Perhaps the same conclusion
would follow if such was his principal purpose.''
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See also In Re Harraden, 118 N.E. 1-±2.
There are nun1erous other cases \vhich deal with this
particular theory pertaining to special missions and
special errands, many of 'vhich deal with one or more
of the issues and involve, in many respects, facts similar
to those, involved in tl1e case before the court.
\V e respectfully recommend reading the following
cases: Altman vs. Kaufman Realty Co. (Pa.) 167 Atl.
394; Redner vs. H. C. Faber and Sons (N.Y.) 119 N.E.
842; City of ~Iilwaukee vs. Althoff (Wis.) 145 N.W.
238; Trader General Insurance Co. vs. Nunley (Texas)
80 8.,\'"". (2) 383: Industrial Commission vs. lEtna Life
Insurance Co., (Colo.) 174 Pac. 589; and Reese vs. Nationa! Surety Co., (Minn.) 203 N.W. 442.

The Respondents feel that there is no conflict in the
evidence that points to the deceased, Mr. Barney, having
been sent on a special errand, and therefore being in the
course of his employment when injured. On the contrary
there is considerable evidence, relating to Mr. Barney's
activities for, and prior to, the fatal day, pointing to an
assignment of Barney by his employer to an exclusive
mission to get the automobile at Magna and to bring it
to Salt Lake City. We submit that the Commission is
the fact finding body, is the arbiter of the facts, and that
they made no error in ruling that Barney was in the
course of his employment at the time of his fatal injury.
We submit that the decision should stand because of the
sufficiency of the evidence as above indicated, supporting the Commission's finding. We, therefore, urge that
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the Commission's award in the case before the court
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GRO,VER A. GILES,
.A,t,torney General

C. N. OTTO·SEN,
.Assistant .Attorney General
At~o~rneys for Defenaants

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

